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¿Podemos encontrar un mecanismo sin transferencias monetaria~ <.¡ue permita a lo~ 
votantes expresar la inten idad de sus preferencias? ¡,Puede la opinión de una minoría 
ser respetada cuando la intensidad de sus preferencias es muy superior a la intensidad 
de las preferencias de la mayoría? En este artículo proponemos una alternativa al sis-
tema común de votación (una persona - una decisión - un voto) en la que cada agente 
dispone de un cierto número de votos que pueden ser libremente distribuidos entre una 
número predeterminado de decisiones. Lo novedoso de este sistema de votación e~ 
que permite a los votante expre ar cuánto les importa cada decisión. Caracteri7..amo~ 
condiciones suficientes en las que este sistema de votación es óptimo y superior a la 
regla de la mayoría, 
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ABSTRACT 
Can we devise mechanisms that a1low voters to express the intensity of their prefe-
rences when monetary transfers are forbidden? Can mjnorities be decisive over those 
issues they feel very strongly about? As opposed to the usual voting system (one per-
son-one decision-one vote), we propose a voting system where each agent is endowed 
with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed freely among a set of issues that 
need lO be approved or dismissed. Its novelty relies on allowing voters to express the 
intensity of their preferences in a simple manner. Thjs voting system is optimal in a 
well-defined sense: in a strategic setting with two voters, two issues and preference 
intensities uniformly and independently distributed across possible values, Qualitative 
Voting Pareto dominates Majority Rule and, moreover, achieves the only ex-ante op-
timal (incentive compatible) allocation. The result a1so holds true with three voters as 
long as the voters preferences towards the issues differ sufficiently. 
Keywords: Voting, lntensity Problem, Alternatives to Majority Rule, Conllict 
Resolution 
JEL Classification: cn, D70, P 16 
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The history of economic institutions shows a great deal of change, facilitating 
economic activities that would have earlier been impossible. No similar development 
and change has occurred in the political system; yet the need for such facilitation is 
undoubtedly equally great 
JAMES COLEMAN (1970) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Voting is the paradigm of democracy. It reflects the desire lo talee everyone's opi-
nion into account rather than imposing, by whatever means, the decision of a particular 
individual. At its rool lies the belief that people should be allowed to casI their votes 
freely and, aboye aH, that they should be treated equally '. In stark contrast to many eco-
nornics situations, side-payments are therefore ruled out in order lo mainlain ex ante 
equality of voting power despite an unequal distribution of material wealth. 
Although a variety of voting rules have been proposed to suil different settings, in 
practice Majority Rule (MR, hereafter) is used almosl exclusively. From an economist's 
perspective, and given that mosl of our work is buill on the diverse behaviour of indi-
viduals with different marginal propensities lO consume, produce, elc., the main diffi-
culty with MR is that il does not capture the intensity of voters' preferences. Just as we 
contemplate the importance of the wiLlingness to pay in the provision of public goods, 
we would expect thal taking into account the wiLlingness to influence in a voting situa-
tion wiU increase efficiency. 
Previously, responses to this criticism have argued that if we were to treat a very 
enthusiastic voter and a very apathetic one differently, equality would no longer hold. 2 
However tbis reasoning is too narrow. In this paper we show thal we can build a very 
simple voting rule that allows voters to express intensity and reach in sorne situalions 
a strictly Pareto superior allocation than the one achieved by MR while preserving 
equality among volers. 
Following Coleman's quote, we wish lo stimulale the debate over the developments 
that should occur in our political inslitutions to malee them better able lO represen! 
and govem our societies. We wanl to consider voting syslems where the concepl of 
decisions preferred by most members is replaced by tha! of decisions most preferred 
I See, for instance, Locke (1690). 
2 See Spitz (1984). 
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by members; we want votes to have an embedded quality which is somehow Iinked to 
the intensity of the voters' preferences; ultimately, we want to show the circumstances 
under which the strategic interactions between voters do not underrnine the gains from 
expressing their willingness to influence. 
In a setting with a c\osed agenda of N issues that have to be approved or dismissed, 
we propose a Qualitative Voting rule (QV, hereafter) that allows voters to si multa-
neously and freely distribute a given number of votes among the issues. In this way we 
are providing voters with a broader set of strategies than the classical «one person -
one decision - one vote» but at the same time preserving equality since aIl individuals 
are endowed with the same ex-ante voting power. We must stress that the Qualitative 
Voting rule resembles other mechanisms (see the Related Literature Section below and 
Chapter 8 in Mueller (2003)); yet, its analysis in a fully strategic setup and its applica-
tion to a situation with binary decisions is novel to this paper. 
EssentiaIly, QV introduces two main improvements on the usual voting rules. On 
lhe one hand, it answers lhe c\assical debate in the polítical science literature on «the 
problem of intensity» by aIlowing strong minorities to decide over weak majorities. 
Secondly, it allows voters to trade off their voting power, adding more weight to the 
issues they most care about, and so unlocks conflict resolution situations. 
The lalter intuition is best captured by the following situation: imagine two voters 
with opposing views in two issues but such that the first (second) voter mostly cares 
about the outcome on the first (second) issue. QV allows each of them to decide on 
their most preferred issue and hence non-cooperatively coordinate on a Pareto opti-
mal allocation. We can devise many different instances in which such situations occur 
and where side payments may not be possible (or may be forbidden): an intemational 
dispute, a bilateral agreement in arms/pollution reduction, a country having the two 
legislative chambers governed by opposing parties,3 a clash between the management 
3 The US Congress and Senate have repeatedly been in a situation with a Republican majority 
in one chamber, and a Democratic majority in the olher, consequently many bilis have been veloed 
by one chamber and decision-making has been difficull. QV could have made the process more 
cfficient by allowing each party to support those bilis which ilS electorate fell more strongly about. 
Money and Tsebelis (1997) c1aim thallhe gains we expect from the use of QV may a1ready be oh--
served through the existence of commiuees: «One essential assumplion of dislributive theories of 
Congress is that lhe policy space is mullidimensional. This is how commitlee chairs and members 
exlract gains from trade. They give up their posilions in lhe less important dimension in order to 
gain in the more important one, lheir own jurisdiclion.» 
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and the union of a particular finn, etc.4 A rigorous analysis of such voting system is 
essential in light of the fact that a varíant of it is currently being used to settle disputes 
(see the artiele «March of the robolawyers» in The Economist, 9/312006). 
The goal of the present paper is not only to compare QV to MR but, also to assess 
its optimality. We therefore talce a mechanism design approach that allows us to cha-
racterise the optimal allocations from amongst the implementable ones. This requires 
us to look at highly stylised scenaríos with preferences over issues being discreteo The 
discrete setting implies, in tum, that we cannot look at very general scenaríos. We 
first look at a conflict resolution situation with two voters, two issues and independent 
uniform priors on the voters' preferences, and see that non-indifferent voters allocate 
all their votes on their most preferred issue. Moreover, we prove in Theorem l that QV 
reaches the only incentive compatible ex-ante optimal allocation. 
We then extend our setting to analyse the potential use of QV in committees -and 
its role in allowing minorities to be decisive- by extending the previous setting and 
considering three voters instead of two. In equilibrium, voters shift their vOling power 
towards the issue they value most, and QV is optimal when voters value their most pre-
ferred issue at least three times as strongly as their least preferred one (Theorem 2).5 
Examples follow the statement of both theorems in order to illustrate the results and 
shed sorne light into the applicability of QV into the real world. The dependence of the 
results on the independent uniform priors is proved to be critical in Section 8: the more 
deterrninistic the priors are, the more strategically voters react and, consequently, the 
more difficult it is to achieve a truthful revelation of preferences. Moreover, the stra-
tegic interactions between individual s may lead to the non-existence of pure-strategy 
equilibria in the game induced by QY. However, this does not undermine the results of 
this paper: there are sorne situations in which one can strictIy Pareto-improve on the 
alJocation achieved by MR through a simple mechanism we have called QY. 
4 Our setting can be reinterpreted as a non-zero surn Colonel Blotto Garne (Iwo colonels 
are fighting over sorne regions and ha ve to decide how lo divide their forces ; Ihe one with larger 
forees wins the region and the winner of the battle is the one with the rnosl won lerritory). If the 
colonel is nol indifferenl belween winning IwO differenl regions, the payoff of the game is not only 
contingent on how rnany regions he has won or lost bul precisely on which regions he has won 
or lost. Myerson ( 1993) also refers lo the Colonel Blotlo Garne when anaJysing the incentives for 
candidates to create inequalities among voters by rnaking heterogeneous carnpaign prornises. 
5 There is al so an equilibriurn !hat replicates the rnajoritarian outcorne. Nevertheless, this 
equilibriurn does not survive any usual refinernent. 
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In the remainder of lhis section we review the exisling literature and relate our 
model lo this earlier work. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
introduces the model, Section 3 analyses the allocalion achieved by QV in a situation 
wilh two voters, Section 4 extends the analysis to a situalion with three voters, Sec-
tion 5 analyses the oplimality of QV, Section 6 presents two examples, Section 7 brietly 
discusses sorne of the resulls, and Seclion 8 concludes. 
1.1. Related literature 
Intensily of preferences can playa role in voting games only if we move away 
from unidimensional settings and allow voters lo trade-off their voting power across 
issues. The gains we expecl from the use of rules such as QV come precisely from non-
homogeneous preferences across issues.6 Accordingly, our work belongs to a wider sel 
of models wilh lwo key features: heterogeneous preferences and a mullidimensionaI 
setting. The case for QV under these conditions resls on a simple comparative advanta-
ge argument: in the same way as each country should specialise by focusing on the sec-
lors of lhe economy where it is relalively more productive, QV a1lows voters to decide 
on the issue lhey care relalively more about. However, this leaves open the important 
question of implementalion. 
The two papers most c10sely related to ours are Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) 
and Casella (2005). Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) show that linking decisions nor-
mally leads lo Pareto improvements. More specifically, they present a simple rule that 
achieves the ex-ante efficient allocation and induces truthful revelation as we increase 
the number of decisions. Such rule is very simple in the sense that itjust requires voters 
to match their voting profiles to the frequency of preferences induced by their prior 
distribution. The key differences with our work is that they provide an efficiency result 
in the limit for a particular indirect mechanism and their action space depends on the 
prior dislribulion of prcfercnces. Instead, we provide an indirect mechanism which 
6 Bowen (1943) has already pointed out lhat MR is an efficient mechanism whenever lhe 
voters ' intcnsity of preferences are disbributed symmelrically. Similarly, Philipson and Snyder 
( 1996) analyse an organised vote market and show lhat its efficiency gains (relalive lo MR) are 
larger lhe more heterogeneous lhe preferences are. 
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does not depend on the prior distribution, and characterise its optimality in a particular 
setting.7 
Casella (2005) proposes a system of Storable Votes to be used in situations where 
voters have to decide over the same binary decision repealedly over lime and shows its 
superiority with respect to MR in a particular setting. Our framework is different in the 
sense that voters simultaneously cast all their votes and know their full preference profile 
at the time of voting (no time dirnension). Moreover, we undertake a mechanism design 
analysis which a1lows us not onIy to compare two particular voting rules but also lo cha-
racterise a11 implementable aIlocations and, from them, identify the optimal ones. 
Most of the Iiterature on mechanism design without transfers (and most of the Iiterature 
on voting) is built in a setting with ordinal utilities where one a1temative has to be selecled 
out of many, i.e. a setting of electing representatives.8 Within that Iiterature, QV has the 
flavour of a scoring rule (specially cumulative voting) though there is a crucial distinction:9 
a scoring rule is used 10 elect one representative out of many, inslead QV deals with a series 
of binary e1ections where N independent issues have to be approved or dismissed. 
The literature on a1tematives to MR is related to our work insofar as it provides 
mechanisms which capture the intensity of the volers preferences but their complexilY 
undermines its applicability (see the chapter entitled «Complicated Altematives lo Ma-
jority Rule» in Mueller (2003». On the one hand, Tideman and Tullock ( 1976) develop 
an application of the Clarke-Groves mechanism to a vOling framework. Needless 10 
say, this requires monetary transfers and hence fails lo satisfy the equalily property. 
On the other hand, Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) propose a Point Voting Rule lO be 
used for the contribution 10 public goods, with perfectly divisible points. JO They focus 
7 Assessing trade-offs between issues and eXlracling all possible gains from differences is also 
one of the main concems of the negolialion analysis and Ihe inlemalional relalions lileratures. See 
for instance Keeney and Raiffa (1991). Closer in spirillo our work, Shepsle and Weingasl ( 1994, 
pg 156) assert thal «The political solulion is lo creale an instilulional arrangemenl for exchanging 
support thal is superior lo a spol markel». Likewise, Levy (2004) models polilical parties as being 
able lo exploil the gains from differing relalive valualions in a multidimensional policy space. 
8 See Gibbard (1973) and Satlerthwaile (1975). 
9 «In a scoring rule, each vOler's ballol is a veclor lhal specifies sorne number of poinls lha! 
this voler is giving to each of the candidales (or parties) lhal are compeling in Ihe eleclion. These 
vole-vectors are sumrned over all volers, lo determine who wins the elecliofl» , Myerson (1999), 
pg. 673-674. 
JO Brarns and Taylor (1996) propose a Point Voting Rule (the Adjusted Winner Procedure) thal 
is essenlially our voting system in a seuing of a conflicl resolulion. Their weakness. though. is thal 
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on providing an (arbitrary) social choice function that induces the truthful revelation 
of preferences. 
When we imagine a way in which politicians give more weight to a particular posi-
tion we immediately think of logrolling or vote trading. The relationship between these 
practices and QV, and the advantages of the latter as a way of expressing willingness to 
intluence, are brietly discussed in Section 7. 
2. THE MODEL 
A voting game is defined as a situation where 1 voters have to dismiss or approve N 
issues and no monetary transfers are allowed. Voters privately know their preference pro-
file across the N issues and the prior distributions from which these preferences are drawn 
are common knowledge. From a mechanism design perspective this is a private values 
multidimensional problem with multilateral asymmetric information and no transfers. 
Voters and issues are denoted ia. { 1,2, ... ,1} and na. { 1 ,2, ... N}, respectively. The value 
voter i places on issue n is O~. The preference vector of voter i is O~ = (0/, ... , O~ a. e 
® 1 N, i = -, 1, ... ,1. 
Preferences should be interpreted as follows: a positive type (O~ > O) wants the issue 
to be approved, a negative one (O~ < O) wants it to be dismissed and the absolute value 
(10,;1) captures the intensity of the preference towards that particular issue. 
Voter i's payoff from the decision on a particular issue, n, is as follows: O: if the 
issue is approved; and, (- O:) if the issue is dismissed. The total payoff is the sum of the 
individual payoffs across the N decisions.' , 
An allocation is a vector of the probabilities that each of the N issues is approved. 
The set of allocations is defined as X = {(P" ... ,PN): p" ... ,PN. a. [0, I]} where Pn is the 
probability issue n is approved; a voter with preferences Oi obtains utility u(p, Oi) from 
allocation PN a. X. 
N N 
u(p fJ): = ~P Oi + ( 1 -p) (_O i) = ~ (2p - l)8 i 
, i.J n n n n L n n 
lhey do not take into account the strategic interactions by assuming players are honest. 
11 The definition of payoffs implicitly assumes that issues are independently valued. That 
is, there are no complementarities between them. Provided that issues are independently valued, 
results can be extended to any linear transformation of lhe payoffs. 
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We are in a setting of private values where each agent's utility depends only on his 
own type and utilities are multilinear. Voters cast their vole allhe inlerim slage; lhat is, 
when lhey know lheir own preferences but only know lhe prior distribulion from which 
lheir opponents' preferences are drawn. The strategy space defined by QV consists of 
mappings from the set of individual preference profiles to the set vOling profiles V 
V: = {(sn' vn)n=I. .. .N: sn a {-l,l 1 and vn a {O,I,···,vl and Ln vn = V 
where each voting profile specifies for each issue whelher the voter wants it to be 
approved (sn = 1) or dismjssed (sn = -1) as well as lhe number of votes (vn) allocated 
to it. 
QV aggregates lhe voting profiles in lhe following way: whenever the total number 
of votes in favour of lhe approval (dismissal) of an issue is larger lhan the number of 
votes in favour of the dismjssal (approval), lhe issue is approved (dismissed). Ties are 
resolved applying tbe usual MR. The relevance of the tie breaking rule is explained in 
Section 4.1 . Briefly, 
for every n = I, ... ,N. 
I Li sin vin > ° U issue n is approved Li S'n Vn < ° U issue n is approved Li SIn Vn < ° U MR is applied 
We want to characterise the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game induced by QY. 
In order to assess tbe optimality of QV we need to characterise the set of implemen-
table mecharusms and select lhe ones lhat maxirruse lhe sum of utilities. 12 In order to 
do lhis, we simplify OUT setting and lhroughout consider a seuing with (i) lwo or three 
voters (1 = 2 or 3), (ii) two issues (N=2), (iii) four valuations per issue (B; a {-I, -1, 
-+1, +1 II a (0,1))13 and (iv) uniform and pairwise independenl priors: Pr (Bnl = 1) = 
12 In Hortala-Vallve (2009) we have proved that any implementable mechanism is charactcr-
ised by inducing indirect utilities that are homogeneous of degree one and convexo We have not 
been able lO solve the optimisation problem while imposing the homogeneity condition . 
13 Note that without loss of generality and in order to simplify the notation we have assumed 
the high issue to take a value equal to one. The analysis is totally analogous to the more general 
setting where 
14 RAFAEL HORTALA.-VALLVÉ 
Pr {e
n
l = -1 } = Pr {e
n
l = e} = Pr {e
n
l = -e} = 1/4 and there is pairwise independence 
across issues and voters. 
We define the set of a voter's preference profiles as f... : = {-I, -1 , -+1 , + 1 } x {-1, -1, 
-+I,+I}. 
3. ON THE USE OF QV IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION SITUATIONS 
The case with 2 voters introduces the main effect of QV as voting rule. It allows 
voters to trade-off their voting power. Specifically, when we consider two issues it 
allows voters to rank the issues and reach the only ex-ante optimal allocation. The next 
example best captures this intuition: 
Example: Two friends, Anna (i = 1) and 10hn (i = 2), are spending an evening to-
gether. Above all they want to be together, however, they can't come to an agreement. 
Anna wants to see a horror film and would like to have dinner in a new Italian restau-
rant while 10hn prefers a comedy film and eating sushi in a lapanese restaurant (i.e. 
we have two linked battle of the sexes games) Following the previous notation, issue 
I corresponds to the film decision (PI is the probability of seeing the horror film and 
I - Plthe probability of seeing the comedy one) and issue 2 to the restaurant decision 
(P2 is the probability of the Italian restaurant and 1- P2 the probability of the lapanese 
one). If they vote on each of the issues nothing is decided and they have to stay at 
home (which we assume is not optimal for either of them). Additionally, suppose that 
Anna really cares about the restaurant decision while 10hn cares more about the film 
(i.e. (JI = «(J, I ) and ()2 = (- I,-B). It seems sensible that, as good friends, each ofthem 
wi ll g ive up on their least preferred option; they will both go to the ltalian restaurant 
and the comedy film yielding an overall utility of 2( I - B) > O. From a game theoretic 
perspective, they are both coordinating on the Parero optimal allocation that maximises 
the sum or utilities. QV is precisely a mechanism that aIlows voters to coordinate non-
cooperatively on the only ex-ante optimal outcome. 
Voters are endowed wilh V>O votes thal can be freely distributed between the two 
issues. We assume that V is even so that voters can split the votes evenly between the 
two issues ir necessary. The uniform and independent priors on the opponenl's prefe-
rences imply that it is an optimal strategy for each player to declare the lrUe sign of his 
preferences, i.e. Sik = sign (e/). 
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Without loss of generality, we analyse the optimal strategy of voter i whenever he 
has positive preferences and he casts v votes in issue l. His payoff is: 
( 1 1 - 0° 0°) (1 1 - 0° 0°) - + -p (vi J>O) 1+ -+_p (V-vi J>O) I 22111222 2 2 
The previous expression captures the property that unanimous preferences are im-
plemented and Pn (v) is the expected value of (2Pn - 1) whenever voter i casts v vo-
tes. They are defined as follows (conditional probabilities are omitted for notational 
simplicity): 
PI (v) := 2 (pr (v - v / > O) + -4- Pr (v - v / = O)) - 1 
PiV - v) := 2 (pr (V - v - (V - v/) > O +  Pr (V - v - (V - v/) = O - 1 
Restricting our attention to symmetric strategies implies that we can rewrite the 
payoff of voter i as 
Voter i wants to maximise the expression inside the curly brackets whenever °1; > 0/, 
i.e. v/ = v. 14 He wants to minimise it when 01; < 0 2;' i.e. vI; = O. The previous expres-
sion shows that a voter that equally weights both issues will be indifferent among any 
voting profile. In what follows we will call a player that values both issues with equal 
intensity, 01; = 02;' an indifferent pI ayer. 
Summing up, the equilibrium strategy for a player with positive preferences has 
si = (1 , 1) and 
14 PI ayer i want to invest a number of votes strictly higher (if possible) than the absolute value 
of his opponent's invested votes on the first issue. Taking into account that pI ayer j plays accord-
ingly; the only equilibrium has non-indifferent players investing all their voting power on their 
preferred issue. 
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. V Ve · e· v' (- -) when 1 = 1 2' 2 I 2 
Hence, QV allows vOlers lo somelimes be decisive in lhe issue lhey value mosl. 
4. ON THE USE OF QV IN COMMITTEES 
We depart now from apure conilicl resolution situation and consider a setting wilh 
three voters. In the previous analysis each voter was seeking to counteract tbe votes 
invested by his opponenl. This effect is still in place but now we have an additional 
element: in sorne situations sorne voters may not be pivotal. Similarly, wilh two voters 
the tie breaking rule had no welfare effects. However, with three voters lhe tie breaking 
rule plays a crucial role and has important welfare effects. 
Voters are endowed with an even number of votes V. Wilh uniform and independent 
priors it is still an optimal strategy for each voter to trulhfully declare his preference 
between the approval and dismissal for each issue. We will now focus on syrnrnetric 
pure strategy equilibria -i.e. all voters play the same strategy. 
We want to focus on the set of final allocations reached in equilibrium ralher lhan 
the sel of equilibria. For this purpose we introduce lhe term essential as an equivalence 
c1ass of equilibria lhat induce the same allocation -notice lhat given lhe nature of our 
game lhere are situations where sorne votes are not pivotal and hence can be placed 
anywhere without affecting the outcome. 
The following Lemma states lhat lhe strategy followed by any voter is independent 
of lhe labelling of lhe issues. That is, lhe strategy of a non-indifferent voter is summari-
sed by a parameter ya {O, l , ... , V} which should be interpreted as lhe number of votes 
invested in his most preferred issue; (V - y) are the votes invested in his least preferred 
issuc. The Lcmma also states that indifferent voters should divide their votes equally 
in a symmetric equilibrium. 
Lernma 1: In a selling with two issues, three voters and uniform and independent priors, 
any symmetric pure strategy essential equilibrium satisfies thefollowing two properties: 
1- Non-indifferent voters a/ways invest y* a {[VI2] , .. . , V } in their most preferred issue. 
2- Indifferent voters Sp/illheir votes evenly. Thal is, they inveSI (VI2) votes on each issue 
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Note that the equivalence cIass allows for different strategies but they all achieve 
the sarue outcome. The proof (which is provided in the appendix) relies on showing 
that an equilibrium which relies on the labelling of the issues cannot be suslained. Ima-
gine, for instance, that there exists an equilibrium where indifferent voters cast more 
votes on the first issue: y* ind > V/2. Any voter would now be better off by deviating and 
casting V - Y*ind0n the first issue -lhe fact that more voles are cast in issue l reduces 
the probability that a single vote will be pivolallhus it is oplimallo shift votes towards 
issue 2. 
Proposition 1 In a setting with two issues and three voters, there are essential/y 
three symmetric pure strategy equilibria. These are: 
y* = V 
y* = V/2 
when B= 1/2 y* = V 
Y*ind = V/2 
Y*ind = V/2 
Y*ind = V/2 
-all votes on preferred issue 
-equivalent to MR 
-all voles on preferred issue 
where y* is the number of votes invested by non-indifferent voters in the mos! preferred 
issue and Y*ind is the number ofvotes invested by indifferent voters in issue one. 
The proof of the Proposition is quite tedious and is lefl to the appendix. Ils difficul-
ties lie in the essential aspect of it; we can devise many possible combinalions of votes 
where no individual is better off by deviating but where sorne votes are not pivotal and 
hence can be placed in any of the issues. The first equilibrium allows strong minori-
ti es to impose their will over weak majorities. The second equilibrium replicates the 
MR allocation. For future reference they will be called Equilibrium QV (EqQV) and 
Equilibrium MR (EqMR), respeclively. Finally, the third equilibrium can be seen as a 
mid point between the other two where a weak majority with an indifferent voter can 
overcome a strong minority. This equilibrium only holds for a particular value of B and 
does nol survive any robustness check.15 
15 This equilibrium disappears whenever we consider the continuous valuation of the issues 
(see Section 7). There are two reasons for lhis: (1) lhe relative intensity for which it holds has 
measure zero in the continuous case (given uniform preferences) and (2) lhe strategy followed 
by indifferent players is crucial for this equilibrium to hold and these voters have in general zero 
measure in lhe continuous case. 
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Since Proposition 1 holds for any number of votes, it will hold when votes are per-
fectly divisible. 16 The multiplicity of equilibria can be resolved by noticing that EqQV 
is the one that survives any usual refinement: if voters randomIy allocate sorne of their 
votes, non-indifferent voters will seek to reduce their probability of losing (Le. increase 
lheir probability of being pivotal) their most preferred issue by investing all their votes 
in it. Henceforth we focus our anention on EqQVY 
4.1. The Tie Breaking Rule 
The tie breaking rule plays a crucial role in the three voters' case and has important 
welfare effects. Consider the probability of a favourable outcome under MR. Given the 
uniforrn priors assumption, a voter observes his wiU being implemented on any issue 
with probability (3/4) since the issue can only be dismissed ifthe remaining two voters 
are opposed 10 him -an event with probability (1/4). Imagine now, that the tie brea-
king rule under QV is the toss of a fair coin, i.e. the issue is approved with probability 
(1/2): the probability of favourable outcome decreases, (112)«3/4). The optimal lie 
breaking rule should maximise the probability of a favourable outcome for any player 
in an incentive compatible way. 
We show that in case of ties, issues should be decided through the usual MR. QV 
beco mes a voting rule that allows issues to be decided on the grounds of the total in-
tensity of preferences. In case the intensity of preferences is not decisive, the issue is 
approved on the basis of overalI support (MR). QV happens to be a natural extension 
of the usual voting rule where voters declare their position with respect to the appro-
valor dismissal of an issue and then invest extra votes to reflect their willingness to 
influence. 
16 In Section 7 below, we show that in lhe case wilh continuous valuation of issues and per-
fectly divisible votes, lhe EqQV and EqMR are lhe only equilibria. 
17 The multiplicity of equilibria when analysing different mechanisms is usually resolved by 
selecting the best equilibrium in each possible situation. Note lhat lhis approach would benefit 
our analysis beca use MR would never be able to do better lhan QV given !hat lhe latter can also 
achieve lhe allocation reached by the former. Therefore, focusing on lhe first equilibrium makes 
our optimality analysis more difficult. 
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5. OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS 
In order to characterise the optimality properties of QV we first need to characteri-
se the set of implementable mechanisms. The Revelation Principie allows us, without 
any loss of generality, to restrict the analysis to the study of direct revelation mecha-
nisms. A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism where the set of messages which 
players may send coincides with the space of preference parameters. The mechanism 
maps these revelations into an allocation (p : fJ.l X) . 
We focus our attention on the set of mechanisms that preserve unanimous wills, 
have no systematic tendency towards the approval or dismissal of any of the issues 
(neutrality) and treat aJl individuals in the same manner (anonymity). Moreover, given 
that we are in a multidimensional selting we want all the issues to be treated equally 
too. It will be useful to define a mechanism as being reasonable whenever it sati sfies 
the previous four properties (notice that MR satisfies them). 
Definition 1 A mechanism P : fJ .l X is reasonable if and only if ir satisfies 
(
1 if (j > 0, -,i 
1. Unanimity:Pn(OI, . . . ,()') = n forany n. 
O if f}" < 0, -,i 
2. Anonymity: Pn (01, ••• ,()') = Pn (ff'(I), .. . ,ff'(T) for any n and (J a sr 
4. Neutrality across issues: -,n= I , ... ,N and ~ma {+ 1 ,- 1 }, -,m= I , ... ,N 
P
n 
(Ol, ... ,()') = P
n 
((~IOII, ... ,Onl, ... , ~,/JNI), ... , (~101/, ... ,0,/, .. . , ~,/JN/» . 
5. Symmetry across issues: -,n= I , ... ,N,-,(J a SN' 
P n (B', ... ,()') = P (f(n) ((OIrT(I)' . .. ,OI(f(N»' ... ' (()'(f(\l' ... '()'(f(N») . 
where Sk denotes the set of all possible permutations of k elements. 
20 RAFAEL HORTALÁ-VALLVÉ 
5.i. implementable mechanisms 
We want to characterise all mechanisms that induce a truthful Bayesian Nash equi-
librium at the interim stage -the moment where each agent knows rus own type (but 
only holds beliefs on his opponents' types) and needs to reveal his type in the direct 
mechanjsm or cast rus votes in the jndirect mechanism. The interim utility of a voter 
thal declares (J while rus type is (Ji ,is defined as: 
u ([ji, (Ji) := E(j-i {u(P(8i, (Ji) (Ji)} 
where, (Fi := (f}, ... ,(Ji-1 ,(Ji+1 , .. . ,f)I). Note that this is simply his expected utility under the 
assumption that his opponents will truthfully reveal their types. To simplify the nota-
lion let us also define the interim prospect on issue n as Pn (8i) = E()-i (2Pn(8i, (Fi) - 1 }.18 
The inlerim utility now reads as u(·, fJ) = Pl)B1 + Pi·)02. 
Implemenlable mechanisms are the ones that satisfy Incentive Compatibility cons-
traints (IC) -il is optimal for each type of voter to reveal his true type. Restricting the 
analysis to the sel of reasonable mechanisms, together with the uniform and indepen-
dent priors implies thal we just need to analyse the ICs from the perspective of a voter 
that posilively values both issues. Condition 5 for a mechanism to be reasonable also 
implies that P2 (0/,02i) = PI (02 i,0/). The three possible interim utilities can now be 
expressed in terms of PI: 
A non-indifferent type: 
An indifferent high type: 
An indifferent low type: 
PI (1,fJ)·1 +P I (0,1)·0 
PI (1,1)-1 + PI (1,1)·1 
PI (0,fJ)·0 + PI (0,fJ)·0 
The nexl Proposilion lells us the conditions thal any reasonable mechanism should 
salisfy in order lO be implementable (nole thal lhe Proposition holds for an arbitrary 
number of vOlers) . 
Proposition 2 A reasonable mechanism p : el.l x is implementable if and only if 
(he following four conditions are satisfied 
18 Note that the interim prospect is the expectation of a linear transformation of the SCF, 
hence it is not a well defined probability. In particular, its domain lies on [-1,1). 
J. P, (1 ,1) = P, (0,8) 
2. P, (1,8) ~ P, (0,1) 
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3. P, ( 1,1 ) ~ (P,(0, 1 ) +P,(I,8)/2 
4. P, (1,1) ~ (P, (0, 1) O +P, (1,8) / (1+8). 
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Proposition 2's proof is an immediate consequence of imposing the conditions for 
truthtelling. The first condition follows from requiring that a high type does not have an 
incentive to deviate by declaring he is a low type together with a low type not havi ng 
incentives to deviate by declaring he is a high type. The rest of the conditions follow 
from considering the remaining deviations. Henceforth P denotes the set of implemen-
table mechanisms. 
Observe that the mechanism treats an enthusiastic and an apathetic voter in exaclly 
the same way (PP , 1) = P, (0,8).'9 This highlights the fact that the first best allocation 
(the one that maximizes the sum of ex-ante utilities) can never be achieved since it 
requires interpersonal comparisons of utility. That is, it requires favouring lhose volers 
with stronger preferences and this can never be incentive compatible. The last three 
conditions imply that the interim utilities should be convexo In particular, they require 
the interim prospect on an issue to be weakly increasing in the declaration on that issue: 
PP,I) ~ P,(O,I) and P ,(I,8) ~ P,(O,8). 
'9 The symmetry across issues property plays a relevanl role for this result to hold true. 
The next example shows that dropping such property may be cri tical in the case with discrele 
preferences: 
There is only one voter (i=1), and there only two issues (n=I,2). The player's 
valuation O,' and °2' are slOchastically independent and uniformly distributed on 
{1 ,2}. Thefollowing SCF is strategy-proofbut is not homogeneous of degree zero 
(i.e. it allocates a different outcome 10 the players ( 1, 1) and (2,2)): 
p/ 1,J )=1 
p¡(1 ,O)=1 
P2 (1,1)=0 
P2 ( 1,0)=0 
p¡(O,I)=O 
p¡(2,2)=0 
P2 (0,1)= 1 
P2 (2,2)=1 
I am indebted to Tilman Borgers for bringing this fact to my attention. 
In Hortala-Vallve (2009) we generally characterise all implementable mechanisms in multi-
dimensional settings with no transfers and show that the «equal treatment of proportional voters» 
holds in general whenever we have a continuous support. 
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52. Is qualitative voting optimal? 
From lhe viewpoint of the designer of lhe mechanism it is reasonable to ask if the 
voting rule he would Iike to implement is lhe best one under lhe «veil of ignorance». 
That is, if we weight all lhe possible combinations of types according to their prior 
distribution, does a given voting rule achieve the best possible allocation? 
As Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) first pointed out, «lhe proper object for welfare 
analysis in an economy wilh incomplete information is lhe decision rule, ralher lhan 
the actual decision or allocation ultimately chosen [ ... ] a decision rule is efficient if 
and only if no olher feasible decision rule can be found lhat may make sorne indivi-
duals better off wilhout ever making any olher individuals worse off.» In our setting 
this means lhat we do not have to compare lhe set of final allocations but lhe set of 
implementable mappings from preference profiles to allocations (i.e. implementable 
mechanisms). It would be useless to provide a welfare analysis lhat ignored incentive 
compatibility constraints because strategic manipulation of privately held information 
will almost surely lead to a different allocation lhan lhe expected one. 
The welfare criteria we are interested in is lhe set of implementable mechanisms 
that reach a Pareto optimal allocation at lhe ex-ante stage.20 Voter i's ex-ante utility 
fromp a Pis denoted u j (P):= En (u(P({f, frj) g)}. 
Definition 3 An ex-ante efficient mechanism p : 8'.L X is an implementable me-
chanism such that there does not exist any other implementable mechanism that makes 
some voters better off and no voters worse off, Le. 
pis ex-ante efficient ~ tl P a P such that uj (P) ~ uj (P) for all i=J, ... ,! 
and uj (P) > u j (p)for some i a {I , ... ,l} . 
Definition 4 A mechanism is said to be optimal if its associated direct revelation 
mechanism is reasonable and ex-ante efficient. 
20 Our definition of ex-ante efficiency corresponds to the notion of ex-ante incentive efficient 
in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). 
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It is important for a mechanism to be ex-ante efficient since then it will be stable in 
the sen se that voters will never want to jointly deviate and choose a different decision 
rule. This argument al so holds at the interim stage: we want mechanisms 10 be robusl 
once agents (privately) know their types. Ex-ante efficiency implies interim efficiency, 
bence our welfare criteria will also imply the stability of the voting rule at the interim 
stage. 
The nighl out example described aboye illustrales that MR is in sorne cases nol in-
terim efficient. In that example, John and Anna had incentives to concede on their leasl 
preferred issue and both go to the Italian restaurant and the comedy film. It follows that 
MR is not ex-ante efficient and that both friends may unanimously agree on resolving 
tbeir dissenting issues through a1ternative methods. 
The assumption that the intensity of the preferences towards each issue can only 
take two values (O and 1) becomes crucial at this point. It allows us lO write Ihe interim 
prospects in terms of a finite number of parameters and, given that we restricted the 
analysis to reasonable mechanisms, the number of parameters is manageable. The opli-
mal mechanisms are simply those that maximise the ex-ante utility of any single voter 
subject to the four constraints in Proposition 2. The detailed analysis of the resulting 
linear program is left to the appendix. 
Theorem 1 In a setting with two issues and two voters, QV is optimal. Moreover, 
MR is not optimal. 
QV replicates the only ex-ante efficient and reasonable mechanism; no olher me-
chanism can do better. 
In the three voters case we have seen that QV has two equilibria: one that replicates 
the MR outcome and one that allows strong minorities to decide over weak majorities. 
The next Theorem tells us when is the second equilibrium ex-ante efficient. 
Theorem 2 In a setting with two issues and lhree vOlers, whenever the values of 
the various issues are «differenl enough» (i.e. O a (0, 1/3)), QV is ex-ante optimal. 
Moreover, in that case MR is nol optimal. 
What do we mean by issues being «different enough»? Recalllhat when we descri -
bed the simplified model we denoted !he relative valuation of a low issue wilh respecl 
lo a high one as O. QV is optimal whenever the valuation of the high issue is al least 
three times the one of the low issue, O a (0, 1/3). In other words, it is oplimal lo im-
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plement the will of an enthusiastic minority as long as the majority does not oppose 
the preference of the minority too strongly -agents want to commit to use such a rule 
before knowing their preferences so that their possibly strong views are not silenced by 
indifferent majorities. 
In the interval e a «1/3),(112)) the allocation achieved by the third equilibrium 
replicates the optimal allocation. For e a «112),1) MR achieves the optimal allocation. 
Proofs are provided in the appendix. Note that the costs of the incentive compatibility 
are captured precisely in the interval e a «1/3),(1/2)): from an ex-ante perspective 
(and regardless of incentive constraints) it is optimal for a strong minority to decide 
over a weak majority when e is below one half. In tbe same way that in the Myerson-
Satterthwaite Theorem (1983) we observe that efficient trade in a bilateral asymmetric 
information setting may not always occur due to incentive compatibility constraints, 
in our setting we have that, in order to achieve a truthful revelation of preferences, the 
planner needs to make sacrifices and not implement the efficient a1location when a 
minority feels only mildly stronger than a majority e a «(1/3),(112)). 
Implicit in the proposal of a voting rule that elicits the voters' intensity of preferen-
ces is the fact that gains can only arise when sorne voters value the issues differently. 
Theorem 2 reinforces this idea and shows precisely that QV is optimal only when the 
valuation towards the issues is different enough. 
6. Two EXAMPLES 
6.1. The two voters' case: conflict resolution 
A more realistic version of the night out example may take the shape of a conflict 
resolution situation. In this case, two parties that have agreed on all concurring issues 
need to resolve sorne dissenting ones. In this context it seems sensible not to expect the 
amicable behaviour we observed in the example aboye. Now, parties may see any con-
cession as a loss and (given the sequential nature of bargaining) may never truthfully 
declare their preferred altematives leading lo the deferring of any decision.2 1 
21 The social psychology literature has largely focussed on the problem of people not declar-
ing what they perceive as less important because there exists the risk that they willlose that issue 
withoul any compensation. See for instance Rubin el al ( 1986). 
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Imagine a family enterprise that, after being badly managed for two generations, is 
in a very delicate situation and decides to hire a manager or CEO to redirect their bu-
siness. The new CEO's team carries out a comprehensive analysis of the situation and 
concludes that the image of the firm needs to be updated and two proposals are made. 
On the one hand a restyling of the logo will change the consumer's perception of their 
brand at a very low cosl. On the other hand, a structural improvement of their main 
product line would also be beneficial to consumers' perceptions and, furthermore, it 
will gain the attention of the press. 
The owners are against any change in their product because this is, from their point of 
view, the essence of their business. Similarly, they cannot contemplate a restyling of their logo 
because it was designed by one of their ancestors and they feel emotionally attached to it. 
The negotiations between both parties are at a deadlock and, as was highlighted be-
fore, any concession is seen as a loss. Furthermore, the parties rank the issues differently. 
The CEO realises that the first policy is interesting given its low costs but it will have no 
persistent effect on the public and he sees the latter as the essential move to refloat the 
firmo Instead, the family owners realise that something has to change but would not like 
to be unfaithful to their ancestor so, aboye all, want to keep their logo. This is a Prisoner's 
Dilemma situation: whatever the opponent does any party is always better off by not con-
ceding and declaring both issues to be equally important (it is dominant to do so). And, as 
it is always the case, the unique equilibrium is a Pareto domjnated one. 
QV allows the voters to unlock the negotiation and non-cooperatively choose the 
Pareto optimal allocation. Let us analyse its 10glc: the CEO and the family are endowed 
with V votes each and invest all votes in their preferred issue. The reason being that, given 
the binary nature of the situation, winning one issue implies losing the remaining one. 
Hence, the optimal strategy is to make sure that the most preferred issue is not lost. 
Note that a particular feature of the contlict resolution situation (voters' preferences 
are opposed) is that is dorrunant for a non-indifferent voter to invest all his votes in hi s 
preferred issue. In other words, the equilibria described in Section 3 and Theorem I is 
strategy-proof whenever the voters have opposing preferences. 
6.2. The three voters' case: a committee meeting 
Imagine now a religious association which is composed of three equally sized fac-
tions. Each faction delegates its rights to one of its members and these representatives 
meet in an annual commütee to update the association's position in two major biologi-
cal scientific advances: human c10ning and the use of stem cells. Imagine that each of 
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the representatives has no c1ue about his opponents' preferences but privately know rus 
own. The most progressive representative has no strong position on either of the issues 
but he is in favour of both. Each of the other two strongly opposes one of the two issues 
and recognises that the positive aspects of the other one outweighs his moral prejudices 
and hence favours it. The next diagram sumrnarises their positions: 
Human c10ning Use of stem cells 
Rl agree agree 
R2 strongly disagree agree 
R3 agree stronglyagree 
If they vote using MR, both issues are approved: a weak majority imposes its will 
over a strong minority. Is that situation optimal? We have just shown that from an ex-
ante perspective (i.e. before voters know what they are going to vote) the MR outcome 
may not be optimal. If the difference between the strength of the strongly disagree and 
the agree positions is wide enough, it is optimal to allow the enthusiastic rninorities to 
decide over the apathetic majorities. 
Following the analysis aboye, the first representative splits his votes evenly, the se-
cond invests all of them in the first issue and the third does the same in the second one 
(as depicted in the table below). 
Human c10ning Use of stem cells 
Rl VI2 V/2 
R2 -V O 
R3 O -V 
The outcome is now the opposite to the one before, both issues are dismissed and 
the overall welfare is strictly higher than the one obtained through MR whenever the 
minority views are intense enough. 
7. OISCUSSION 
The equilibrium of the voting game is not driven by the non-divisibility of points 
or the binary nature of preferences. Whenever we consider preferences to belong to 
the interval [-1,1] with independent and uniform priors, voters still follow the strategy 
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described aboye: they invest all their votes in their most preferred issue or, in the case 
with three voters, they may split their votes evenly.22 
Conversely, the optimality analysis rested heavily on the binary nature of the pre-
ferences and the uniform and pairwise independent priors. It seems natural to relax the 
lalter assumptions and check whether the main optimality results are affected by such 
a change. A more precise knowledge of the opponents' preferences may lead to the 
non-existence of pure strategy equilibria in the garue induced by QV The intuition is 
the following: for the voting profiles to be an equilibrium in a complete information 
framework, no voter should invest a single vote in an issue he is going to lose; conse-
quently, a single vote should be sufficient to win any issue and overcoming the single 
vote invested by an opponent will occur almost surely.23 Hence, relaxing the priors 
may lead to sorne critica! problems in the applicability of QV and in its optimality 
properties.24 
Briefly, we have seen that more skewed priors may lead to voters becoming more 
strategic. Consequently, it is more difficult lO achieve truthful revelalion of preferences 
and these interactions may outweigh lhe welfare gains we expect from the use of QV 
This contrasls wilh the behaviour we observe under MR where voters always declare 
their type truthfully. In other words, MR is robust to any possible specification on the 
preferences' prior distribulions. 
It is largely the aboye observation that leads us to the general analysis of the intensi-
ty problem in a related paper where we characterise all the implementable mechanisms 
that are robust to any specification of the priors (when no transfers are allowed) as 
those that induce indirect utilities that are homogeneous of degree one and convexo We 
then proceed to show that the utilitarian allocation (the one that maximises the sum of 
utilities) is not achievable. When we impose lhe unanjmity property -an issue must 
22 Formal proofs of lhese statements are available from lhe aulhor upon requesl. 
23 In general it is also true lhat lhe situation where ties occur in all issues is not an 
equilibrium. 
24 This may contrast with the intuition derived from Cremer and McLcan (1988) that cor-
relation allows the attainment of an efficient allocation. The result does not follow in our setting 
because correlation enhances lhe strategic interaction between individuals without introducing 
arbitrarily large penalties associated with Iying (recall that we are not allowing lransfers). Jackson 
and Sonnenschein (2007) provide an example lhal illuslrales how lhe correlalion on lhe intensily 
belween the issues affects lhe gains we expect from linking decisions: perfccl positive correlation 
collapses lhe problem into a one-dimensional one; conversely, perfecl negalive correlation is the 
best possible scenario for QY. 
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be approved (dismissed) with certainty if all voters support (oppose) it- we show that 
there exists no robust mechanism that is sensitive to the intensity ofvoters' preferences. 
These negative results may explain the absence of such mechanisms in the real world. 
Still, they do not undermine the value of characterising mechanisms and situations 
where strict Pareto improvements are possible. 
The usual way for political parties to express the intensity of their preferences is 
through logrolling. Logrolling is defined as the exchanging of votes among legislators 
to achieve the approval or dismissal of the issues that are of interest to one another. 
Heuristically we could say that QV is related to 10groHing in the same way monetary 
econorrues are related to barter. It eases the ways through which agents can express 
their willingness to influence given thal it does not require a double coincidence of 
wants. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect that this increased freedom in the 
available strategies should prevent agents trading their votes because under QV a vote 
for an issue can never be worthless since it can be unilatera1ly moved to a more relevant 
issue. 
The problem of modelling such phenomena theoretically arises because they usua-
lIy occur in a situation where agents have sorne knowledge of their opponents' prefe-
rences but there is still scope for the understatement of one's preferences and, of COUf-
se, the violation of the agreement once it is made.25 The latter can be easily overcome 
via reputational arguments but the former generates major difficulties and remains an 
area of interest for future research. 
Finally, lhe selection of the agenda is shown lo be a central issue when analysing 
QV and is one of the most important problems that arises in any negotiation. The intro-
duction of a new bill can drastically change the action taken by a particular individual. 
The question is then, how, by who and when should the issues be selected? There is 
a c1ear incentive to manipulate the agenda in order to induce particular outcomes and 
bundle issues that benefit particular groupS.26 Nevertheless, the literature lacks trac-
25 In Hortala-Vallve (2009) I analyse in detail vote trading agreements. 
26 As an example of the scope of such a problem see Metcalfe (2000). In the context of crimi-
nalising bribery at an intemational level between OECD countries, he shows how the agreement 
on the agenda monopolised the negotiations for twelve years. He also emphasizes the perverse 
effect that the introduction of a divisive issue has in a negotiation: it creates a conflict between 
two factions that strongly disagree on the outcome of such issue and prevents any agreement be-
ing reached on the remaining ones. In a different setting Dutta y cols. (2004) define and prove the 
existence of an equilibrium for agenda formation when one altemative has to be selected out of 
many --other studies on agenda setting can be found therein. 
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table models of agenda setting and it remains unelear the amount of information on 
opponents' preferences that would be required for successful manipulation. We have 
therefore restricted ourselves to cases in which the agenda is exogenously given. 
8. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an altemative to the usual voting rule which is simple and allows 
voters to express theÍI willingness to intluence. The proposed mechanism seems to 
be the most natural extension to MR and we have proved it to be not only superior to 
MR but al so to be a mechanism that achieves the best possible allocation and induces 
truthful revelation of the voters' preferences in sorne senings. Motivated by our initial 
quotation we have extended the use of purely economic concepts into the political 
system. Nevertheless, the need for further analysis of this and similar mechanisms is 
e1ear. 
The main findings of this artiele are summarised in its two theorems: (1) QV un-
locks confuct resolution situations allowing each of the opponents to trade off their 
voting power between the various divergent issues; and (2) in a situation with more 
than two voters, QV allows very enthusiastic minorities to decide on those issues that 
the majorities are mostly indifferent towards. 
Given the appealing properties of QV as a simple altemative to MR that could 
easily be used in the real world we are currently analysing its performance in an expe-
rimental setting. 
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APPE NDI X 
PROOF OF PART 1 OF LEMMA 1 
Given uniform and independent priors we can restríct our attention without loss of 
generality to voters with positive preferences. 
Assume that there is an equiljbrium where non-indifferent voters use different stra-
tegies. That is, where a voter that prefers the first issue invests y on his preferred issue 
and a voter that prefers the second issue invests w on his preferred issue (y of. w). Fi-
nally, an indifferent voter invests Yind on the first issue (without loss of generality we 
assume that Yind ~ Vl2). Once again, the assumptions on príors imply that y, w ~ V/2 and 
y ~ Yind' W ~ V - Yind. We now show that the proposed strategies cannot in fact form an 
equiljbrium because an indifferent voter always has incentives to deviate. 
Any voter can face thirty six possible situations on each issue depending on the stra-
tegies played by his opponents. In sorne situations the votes cast by his opponents are 
higher or equal than zero in which case, regardless of his strategy, the issue is approved. 
Similarly, if the invested votes are smaller or equal than -V the issue is dismissed. The 
table below depicts these situations with a positive and negative sign, respectively. The 
remaining cells capture the total number of votes cast by voters two and three: 
ISSUE I 
7 + + + + + + 
7¡nd 7¡nd -7 + + + + + 
V-w V-w-7 V-w-7nd + + + + 
-(V - w) 
-V-w-7 -V-w-7ind -2(V - w) + + + 
-7ind -V - W-7¡nd V - w-7¡nd + + 
-7 -V-w-7 V-w-7 7¡ml - 7 + 
-7 -7ind -(V - w) V-w 7ind 7 
We can replicate the same table for Issue 2 by consideríng the following set of 
actions {-w, -(V - r ind), -(V - y), V - r, V - Yind' w} . We can then compute the final 
allocation in each possible situation whenever voter one follows the three possible 
strategies. That is, whenever he invests (Yind, V - r ind , (y, V - r) or (V - w, w). In order lo 
compute the expected interím payoffs we define the following parameters: 
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a=1 ;;2 V - r - w + r ind <: O a=-I ;;2 V - r - w + r ind < O 
b=1 ;;2 
-2 V + 2w + r ind > O b=-l ;;2 -2V + 2w + rind ~ O 
c=1 ;;2 2V - w - 2rind <: O c=-l ;;2 2V-w- 2 rind <0 
d=1 ;;2 2V - r - w - r ind <: O d=-I ;;2 2V-r- w -rind <O 
e=1 ;;2 
-v + 2r - r ind >0 e=-l ;;2 -V+2r-rind~O 
B=I ;;2 
-2V+ r+ 2w> O B =-1 ;;2 -2V + r+2w~0 
C= 1 ;;2 2V-2r-w<:0 C=-I ;;2 2V-2r-w<0 
Weighting each possible situation by its probabili ty27 we have that the expected 
payoffs (we denote them nO) from playing the three possible strategies are 
n(Y¡nd ' V - Y¡n) . 64 = 58 + 2a + b + 4c + 2d + e 
n(y, V - y) . 64 = 60 - 4a + 4d - 3e + B + 2C 
n(w,V- w)· 64 = 63 +4a-4b-4c -4d-2B-C 
Now we just need to consider all possible combinations of parameters to check 
whether it is strictly better to deviate. Analysing the previous inequalities we know the 
following set of inequalities needs to be satisfied: 28 
a <: C ~ d ~ c and B <: b. 
Whenever a=-I an indifferent voter is strictly better off by playing (y, V-y). Hence, 
for the proposed strategies to be an equilibrium a should be equal to one. 
Repeating the previous reasoning for d = -1 we can also see that an indifferent voter 
has incentives to deviate by playing (V - w,w). Thus, C = d = l. 
Now assume that c = -l. In that case, the expected interim payoffs are equal to 
Il (Y¡nd' V - Y¡n)· 64 = 58 + b + e and n(w, V - w)· 64 = 66-4b- 2B. Note that it is not 
strictly better to deviate only when b = e = B = l. It can be easily shown that d = 1 and 
b = 1 imply that w> y, but d = 1 and e = 1 imply that V + y - w - 2 y nd > O. The latter 
incquality cannot hold when w> y. Hence, in equilibrium, a = C = d = c = l. 
27 Given the uniform and independent priors, all columns (altematively rows) occur with 
probability (1/8) except columns two and five which occur with probability (1/4). 
2X For instance, a = -1 \.J C = d = e = -l. 
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Suppose now that B = 1. First note that in that situation e should be equal to -1 
because e = 1 implies (together with d = 1) that w > y and this is not compatible with 
V + Y - w - 2Y¡nd > O (this inequality results from combining e = 1 and B = 1). Thus e 
= -1. Nevertheless, in that situalion a non-indifferenl voter that prefers issue 2 is betler 
off by deviating and playing (Y¡nd ,V - Y¡n). Hence, in equilibrium B = b = -l. 
e = 1 implies, as before, that a non-indifferent voter that prefers issue 2 is better 
off by deviating and playing (Y¡nd ,V - Y¡n). And finally, e = -1 achieves an aHocation 
which is identical to having all voters splitting evenly their voting power (hence it is 
essentially a situation where r = W = Yü1d and aH values are c10se enough to (VI2), i.e. 
2V-3y~O). 
Finally, the independent and uniform priors imply that the number of votes invested 
in the most preferred issues should be at least as big as the number of votes invesled in 
the least preferred one, i.e. y ~ VI2. 
PROOF OF PART 2 OF LEMMA 1 
This proof is analogous to the previous one. Assume that there is an equilibrium 
(y, Y¡nd) such that indifferent voters do nol split their voting power evenIy. That is, an 
equilibrium lhat reaches a different aHocation to (y, VI2). Without loss of generality 
we assume thal Y¡nd> VI2. Given thal the only equilibrium with r = Y¡nd is (VI2,v/2) 
we have thal y> rü1d > V/2. As before, lhe uniform and independent priors allow us lO 
do our analysis from the perspective of voler one and we assume that he has positive 
preferences (i.e. he desires the approval of both issues). 
We should now replicate the table aboye with the thirty six possible situations 
thal a voter can face on each issue depending on the strategy played by both his 
opponents.29 
We can now compute the final aHocation in each possible situation whenever voler 
one follows the proposed strategy and whenever he unilaterally deviates and invesls 
(V - r¡n) votes in the first issue. As noted in the main text, we want to consider a devia-
tion where voler one, realising lhal both hi s opponents invesl more voting power on the 
firsl issue, deviales and casts more voles on the second one. Furthermore, the conside-
29 For issue I the set of actions is {-y, -y¡nd' -(V - y), (V - y) , YituJ' y) and for issue 2 the set 
of actions is {-y, -(V - Yin) , -(V - y), (V -¡), (V -¡in)' ¡). 
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red deviation does not change rus payoff when he faces non-indifferent voters_ In order 
to compute the expected interim payoffs we detine the following pararneters: 
a=1 ;::2 V - 2y + Yind ~ O a = -I ;::2 V-2y+ yind<O 
b=1 ;::2 -2V + 2y+ Yind > O b=-I ;::2 -2V+ 2y+ Yind '" O 
c=1 ;::2 2 V - Y - 2 Yind ~ O c=-I ;::2 2V - Y- 2yind < O 
d=1 ;::2 
-2V + 3 Yind '" O d=-l ;::2 -2V + 3Yind > O 
Weighting each possible situation by its probability we have that the expected pa-
yoffs when non-deviating and deviating are respectively [(27 - 2b + 4c - a) + (3 1 + 2a 
+ b )] /64 and TI + [8 - 4c + 4d] / 64. Now we just need to consider all possible com-
binations of parameters to check whether it is strictly better to deviate. 
Whenever d = 1 or c = -1 it is strictly better to deviate. Instead, when d = -1 and 
c = 1 both strategies yield the sarue expected payoff. Nevertheless in that situation 
sorne of the hypotheses are violated: for b = -a = 1 and b = -a = -1, (r, r ind) is essentia-
lIy equal to (r,V /2); instead, when a = b = 1, (r, r ind) does not constitute an equilibrium 
because a non-indifferent voter that prefers issue one is strictly better off playing r ind 
votes on the tirst issue; finally, the case a = b = -1 can never happen. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
This proof is analogous to the previous ones. Given that indifferent voters invest VI2 
votes in each issue we have that all possible combinations votes cast on any of the issues 
by two voters that follow the strategy (r,(VI2») are depicted in the matrix below: 
y + + + + + + 
V/2 V 12 - Y + + + + + 
V -y V- 2y V 12 - y + + + + 
-(V- y) - 3V12 
- 2(V- y) + + + + y 
- V 12 
- 3V12+ y VI 2- y + + 
-y V-2y V 12- y + 
-y - V 12 
-{V- y) V-y VI2 y 
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As we did earlier, we define the following four pararneters: 
a =1 ;? v~2,- V a=-I ;? v <2,- V 
b=1 ;? v ~ ,- V/2 b=-I ;? v<,-V/2 
c=1 ;? v> (3/2) v-, c=-I ;? v:> (3/2) V-, 
d=1 ;? v> 2V - 2, d=-I ;? v:> 2V -2, 
where v indicates the number of votes invested in issue one by the remaining voter. Wi-
thout loss of generality we assume that this voter has positive preferences and strictly 
prefers the first issue. 
(y, V/2) is an equilibrium if and only if it is optima! for the remaining voter to invest 
exactly y votes on the first issue (i.e. v = y should be optimal). 
We proceed by defining all possible cases such that the conditions that define 
the four pararneters are welI ordered. For instance, whenever y> 5V/6 we have that 
O ~ 2 V - 2y ~ y - V/2 ~ 3 V/2 - y ~ 2y - V ~ Vand it can easily be shown that v = y is an 
optimal response for voter one. Hence, (y, V/2) is a symmetric equilibrium as long as 
ya (5V/6, V]. This set of equilibria are essentially identica! to (V, V/2). 
A further analysis shows that there exists no symmetric equilibrium where 
ya (3V/4,5V/6]. The case in which y = 3V/4 implies that 0< y- V/2 < 2V - 2y= 2y- V 
< 3 V/2 - y < Vand a symmetric equilibrium can be sustained if and only if y = 1/2. If 
y < 1/2, voter one prefers investing more voting power on his preferred issue, whereas 
he prefers to split his votes more equally whenever y> 1/2. Hence we conclude that 
(3V/4,V/2) is an equilibrium if and only if y =112. Moreover, that equilibrium can be 
sustained by any ya (2V/3, 3V/4]. 
Finally, ya (V/2, 2V/3) can constitute a symmetric equilibrium only when y ~ 1/2; 
when y <112, a non-indifferent voter knows that by deviating and investing all of his 
voting power on his preferred issue he gains that issue when he is confronted with an 
indifferent voter and a low one (but he loses it if he invests y votes). This equilibrium 
reaches the same a!location as MR. In fact, (V/2,V/2) is trivially an equilibrium for 
any y because any voter is equally pivotal with any number of votes (in particular with 
y = V/2). 
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Proof ofTheorem 1 
Any direct mechanism is defined by 512 parameters. That is, all possible combi-
nations of both voters' types multiplied by the number of issues we are considering. 
Restricting the analysis to reasonable mechanisms renders the problem tractable and 
simplifies the analysis into six parameters; we need to define the mechanism only on a 
particular issue when both voters' preferences on that issue are opposed and this can be 
done regardless of the sign of the remaining issue. 
More precisely, the neutrality property defines the value of the mechanism whe-
never voters have analogous preferences (i.e. whenever both voters coincide on how 
strongly they prefer each issue) and allows us to focus on positively vaIued issues 
(when the agent we analyse wants the approval of the issue). The symmetry across 
issues allows us to focus on a particular issue (say, issue one) and the neutrality across 
issues property reduces rhe possible types we have lo analyse to four because the me-
chanism has to be invariant with respect to the sign of the remaining issue. Finally, 
unanimity implies that we only have to consider the cases when the opponent wants the 
dismissal of issue one. The next table depicts the six parameters that uniquely define 
any mechanism given the properties aboye: 
( 1,0) //2 A B e 
(8, 1) //2 D E 
( 1,1) //2 F 
(8,0) 1/2 
(- 1,0) (-8, 1) (-1,1) (-8,0) 
Note that these parameters are the probabilities of approving an issue, henee they 
lie in the interval [0,1]. We define the interim prospects given the four possible decla-
rations as PI ( 1,0), PI (8, 1), PI (1, 1) and PI (8,0). For instance, 
- 1 ( 1 ) PI(I,0)=2{E¡¡(p(I,0),O)} - 1 =28 2'+A+B+C+4 -1. 
The optimal (reasonable and ex-ante efficient) mechanism is the one that maxi-
mises the ex-ante utility subject to the truthtelling eonstraints (Proposition 2) and the 
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feasibility ones (the six parameters need to belong to the interval [O, l D. The program 
reads as follows 
max A.B,C,D.E,F a [0,1] u i (p) = 8 [ 3 + A + C - D + F + ( 4 - A - B + E + F ) B] 
subject to -B + C - D + E + 2 F - l = O 
2A + B + C - D - E - 1 ~ O 
-óB - 2C - 6D - 2E + 4F + 6 ~ O 
-A - 2B - C - D + F + 2 + ( A - B - 2D - E + F + l ) e 5, O 
Solving thjs linear program we get that A = C = B = 1, D = E = O and F = Y2. This 
allocation is the same as the one achieved by QV, hence QV is optimal.30 
Proof ofTheorem 2 
Any direct mechanjsm is now defined by 8192 parameters. Restricting the analysis 
to reasonable mechanisms renders the problem tractable and simplifies the analysis 
into 44 parameters belonging to the interval [0,1]. The following tables define the para-
meters depending on the preferences of each individual. Note that since we have three 
voters the final allocation should be a three dimensional table. Hence, in order to depict 
it we provide four tables each one corresponding to a different preference profile of 
voter one (as we assume throughout, voter one has positive preferences towards both 
issues). 
30 Note that IC implies that players that are indifferent between the issues should be treated 
analogously at the interim slage whether they hold slrong or weak preferences. We have now 
proved that this is not only the case at the interim stage but also at the ex-post stage. In other 
words, the optimal implementable SCF does not undertake ex-post interpersonal comparisons of 
utility. 
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(1,0) A B C O 
(0,1) E F G H 
(1, 1) K L 
(0,0) M N O P 
01 = ( 1,0), (-0,0) I-M Q R S P L H O 
(-1,1) 1-1 T U R O K G C 
(-0,1) I-E V T O N 1 F B 
(-1,0) I-A l-E 1-1 I-M M E A 
(-1,0) (-0,1) (-1,1) (-0,0) (0,0) (1 , 1) (0,1) (1,0) 
(1,0) E F G H 
(0,1) I-V a b e 
( 1, 1) I-T d e 
(0,0) I - Q g h 
01 = (0,1), (-0,0) I-N I-g k f e H 
(-1,1) 1-1 I-d h e b G 
(-0,1) I-F I-a I-d I-g g d a F 
(- 1,0) I-B I-F 1-1 I-N I-Q I-T I-V E 
(-1,0) (-0,1) (-1,1) (-0,0) (0,0) (1, 1) (0,1) (1,0) 
( 1,0) K L 
(8, 1) I -T d e 
( 1.1 ) 1- U 1- 1 n o 
(0.0) I - R 1 - j P q 
(JI = ( 1.1 ). (-0.0) 1- 0 I - h I - p q o f L 
(-1,1) I - K I -e I - n I - p p n e K 
(-0. 1) I -G I - b I-e I - h 1 - j 1-1 d 
(- 1.0) I -C I - G I-K 1-0 I-R I-U I-T 
(-1.0) (-0, 1) (-1,1) (-0,0) (0,0) (1, 1) (O,!) (1,0) 
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( 1,8) M N O P 
(8,1) I-Q g h 
( 1,1) I - R 1 - j p q 
(8,8) I - S I - k I - r 
8' = (8,8), (-8,8) I - P l - i I - q 1 - s q P 
(-1,1) I - L 1 - f 1- 0 I - q I - r p h O 
(-8, 1) I-H I - c I - f l -i I-k 1 - j o N o 
(-1,8) I - D l - H I - L 1 - P I - S l - R l - Q M 
(-1,8) (- 8,1) (-1 ,1) (-8,8) (8,8) (1,1) (8, 1) ( 1,8) 
Similarly to the proof ofTheorem 1, we just need to compute the interim prospects 
in terms of these parameters and maximise the ex-ante utility of any of the voters sub-
ject to the truthtelljng constraints. The interim prospects are proportional to: 
P(I ,O) = -9 + A + 2D + 2B + 2C + 2F + 2G + 2H + 21 + 2K + 2L + 2N + 20 + 2P + 
2Q + 2R + S + 2T + U + V 
P(O, 1) = 2 + 2E - B + 2G + 2H - 21 - 2N - 2Q - 2T - 2V + 2i + a + 2b + 2c + 2f + 2h 
+ 2j + l + k + 2e 
P(I,I ) = 9 + 21 + 21 + 2L - 2T + 2d + 2f - 2U - 21 + n + 20 - 2R - 2j + 2q - 20 - 2h 
-2G - C - b + r 
P(O,O) = 12 - 2L - 2f - 2R - 2j + 20 - D - 2H - 2Q - 2S + 2h + 2N - 2k + 2g - c - o 
+ 2p + 2M + s - 2r. 
The optimal (reasonable and ex-ante efficient) mechanism is the one that maximi-
zes the ex-ante expected utility subject to the truthtelling constraints and the feasibility 
ones (i.e. the forty parameters need to belong to the interval [0,1 D. 
max ui (P) 
subject to PI (1,1 ) = PI (0,0) 
PI ( 1,0) ~ PI (0, 1) 
PP ,I)~(P I (O,I) +PI (1,0)/2 
PI( I , I )$(PI (O, I)O+PI (1,0))/( 1 + 0). 
The end of the proof relies on writing the program in terms of the forty parameters 
and then, step by step, assuming whether or not any of the constraints is binding. Once 
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this is done we are just left with sorne tedious (though trivial) linear programs. And it 
can be proved that for different values of O the comer solution varies. More specifically, 
all parameters are equal to one except those specified below: 
O a (0,1/3) : 
O a (1/3, 1/2) : 
R = S = U = b = c = j = k = I = O 
Q=R = S = T = U = j = k=l = r = O 
O a (1/2, 1) : Q = R = S = T = U = V = j = k = 1 = r = O. 
A detailed analysis of such allocations tells us that they coincide witb the alloca-
tions achieved by the strategies where a non-indifferent voter invests V, 3 V/4 and V/2 
votes on his preferred issue, respectively. 
The equilibria with continuous preferences 
and divisible votes (2 players) 
We reslricl the analysis lo pure strategy equilibrium. In order to simplify the anal y-
sis we assume a uniforrn distribution on the relative intensities rather than on the pre-
ferences themselves i.e. 
0,/ e {±I,±O¡ 
Pr {IOl il > ¡B/ I} = {¡B/I > 102il} = + 
0- U[O,I] 
Pairwise independence across issues and voters. 
Wc analysc the cquilibrium from the perspective of a voter with positive preferen-
ces. Thc inlcrim expectcd payoff of voler i when he invesls vi a [O, V] 1 votes on the 
lirsl issuc is P1( viW1i + P2(V - viW2i where 
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Simple calculations allow us to rewrite the interim expected payoff of voter i as:31 
-}82 1 + (Pr (vi + vi> O) + -}pr (vi + vi = O») (811 - 821) 
Hence, an indifferent voter is indifferent between playing any of the strategies (as 
was done in the binary case, we assume that he plays the undominated strategy vi = V/2) 
and a non-indifferent voter (say he prefers issue one) wants to maxirnise the expression 
inside the curly brackets. In the case where vAU}(-) induces an atomless distribution on 
[O, V] it is optimal for voter one to sel Vi = . Otherwise, if the induced distribution on the 
invested votes by voter j on issue one is not atomless, vi will always be strictly higher (if 
possible) than the absolute vaJue of the lowest possible value of vi. Thus. the only equi-
librium has non-indifferent voters investing all their voting power on their preferred 
issue. FinaJly note thal the proof can also be applied to the case of continuous preferen-
ces and non-divisible votes. We just need to restrict the set of strategies of voter i. 
The equilibria with continuous preferences 
and divisible votes (3 players) 
The setting is analogous to the one described in the proof above. We jusl need lO 
add the restriction that we focus our analysis on symmetric equilibrium (i.e. the lhree 
voters play the same strategy) and we further assume that voters behave equivalently 
regardless of the labelling or the sign of the issue. 
This proof is a bit more complicated than the one above because now we need lo 
consider whether each of them is in favour or against the approvaJ of each of lhe issues 
in order to assign the appropriale sign to the cast votes. Once we take this into account 
we have that the interim prospects read as follows (vi, JI ~ O): 
31 Conditional probabilities are omitted for notational simplicity. 
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Note that the tie breaking rule is now playing a role because voter i just needs to 
equate the sum of his opponents votes whenever only one of them desires the dismissal 
of the issue. Given the assumption that voters play equivalently regardless of the sign of 
hi s preferences we have that vi and (1- vi) have the same induced distribution (the same 
can be said about voter k's strategy). That implies that vi is symmetrically distributed 
around V12. In order to simplify the notation we define X := vi + vk (which, accordingly, 
is symmetrically distributed around V i.e. Pr(X < k) = Pr(X> 2V - k) for k a [O,2V]). 
Using such symmetry and lhe fact that (vi + (1 - vk» is distributed as X, we can write 
the interim expected payoff for a voter that prefers issue one as follows 
ct + = t (t -e) Pr (X < vi) + (1 - te) Pr (X ~ V + vi) 
First note that whenever both opponents are splitting lheir voting power evenly (lhe 
case of MR), voter i is indifferent between playing any of the strategies. In particular 
vi = VI2 is a best response. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium has all voters always split-
ting thcir voting power equally among both issues. 
In the remainder of lhe proof we show that there exists only one more (and only 
one) equilibrium which corresponds to the one in which non-indifferent voters invest 
aH their voting power on their preferred issue.32 
Any other equilibrium wiH have non-indifferent voters investing more than Vl2 
votes on their preferred issue. Consequently, any voter with e a [0,1/2) c1early invests 
aH his vOling power on his preferred issue. Suppose now that there are sorne voters wilh 
e a 11/2,11 such that vi < V. Theorem 1 teH us that lhe optimal strategy is a well behaved 
runction (decreasing wilh respeCllO fJ) lhus we can consider a parameter e a [1/2,1] 
such that any voter wilh (j+- > e invesls strictly less votes on his preferred issue (vi 
«()+) < V) and any voter wilh ()+ < e sticks lO lhe strategy vi = V. 
Given thal both are acting optimally we have that the next two inequalities should hold: 
(Pr(X < V) - Pr(X < vi (8-» x (O - ~) ~ (Pr(X ~ 2 V) - Pr(X ~ V + Vi (8-» x (2 - 8-) 
12 Thc behaviour of indifferent voters does not need to be specified because they have zero 
mcasurc. Ncverthcless. it can be shown that lheir best response to any of lhe equi libria is splining 
lhcir voting powcr evenly. 
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(Pr(X < V) - Pr(X < vi (fr)) x (tJt - +) $ (Pr(X $ 2V) - Pr(X $ V + vi (fr)) x (2 - tJt) 
Given that the optima] function is decreasing we have that we should consider two 
possible cases: (1) the function ~ smooth at e (i.e. limEl. o vi (O + é) = V) and (2) there is 
a discontinuity (i.e .. limE.l o Vi (e + -) = ii < V). Consequently, taking limits as fr and tJt 
tend to e in the previous inequalities lead to two possible equalities depending on the 
behaviour of the optimal strategy at O: 
1: (Pr(X < V) - Pr(X < vi (fr)) x (O -~) $ (Pr(X $ 2V) - Pr(X $ 2V) x (2-8) 
2: (Pr(X < V) - Pr(X < ii) x (O - +) $ (Pr(X $ 2 V) - Pr(X $ V + ii) x (2 -8) 
Trivially, the first equaJity cannot be met because there is a positive measure of ty-
pes playing the non-diversification strategy thus Pr(X = 2V) > O. The second case al so 
leads to a contradiction given the following inequalities and the fact that one of them 
will always be strict: 
28-1$2-0 
(pr(X < V) - Pr(X < ii) $ 2 (Pr(X $ 2V) - Pr(X $ V + ii)) 
The second inequality needs sorne clarification. The term in brackets on the RHS 
accounts for all those cases in which both opponents are investing strictly more than 
(V + ii) votes (i.e. X a (V + ii,2V)). That is, those cases in which both voters have 
a type belonging to the interval [0,8). Hence this occurs with probabilily p2 where 
p := Pr (e a [0,8)). Instead, the LHS accounts for those cases in which X belongs to 
[ii, V). A necessary condition for that event is that none of the voters should invests V 
votes i.e. it occurs with a probability lower than I - p. Given that e is uniformly distri-
buted, we know that p ~ 1/2. 
Finally, we just need to see that the second inequality is strict for p > 1/2 and the 
first one is strict for p = 1/2. 
